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This article offers an analysis and critique of the political response to the 2011 urban riots 
in England.  A brief account of the riots is advanced, where I connect the eruptions to the 
rise of advanced marginality and class/territorial stigmatisation in English cities, not only 
in terms of material deprivation but to the denial of dignity they imply.  The article then 
re-places the swift deployment of punitive action and the ‘broken society’ discourse in 
response to the riots within the broader re-engineering of the state according to a 
neoliberal blueprint that articulates (inter alia) social welfare reduction and penal 
expansion at the bottom of the class structure, in contrast to a laissez-faire attitude at the 
top.  By paying closer attention to the changing relationship between information and 
power (and in particular, the role of conservative think tanks), what Paul Gilroy calls a 
‘poverty of the imagination’ in addressing urban problems is exposed and challenged, 
revealing that the main issue to be addressed is not a broken society but a broken state.  
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 I am indebted to Loïc Wacquant for our invigorating exchange of e-mails as the riots were taking place, 
from which I drew inspiration and analytical insight.   The first paragraph of this essay was practically 
rewritten by him, and, I hope, sets the tone for what follows. 
On 11th August 2011 in Camberwell Green magistrates court, a 23-year-old student with 
no criminal record was sentenced to a prison term of six months for stealing bottled water 
worth £3.50. This extraordinarily harsh sentence would normally be cause for widespread 
denunciation of judicial abuse but, following five nights of fiery rioting across a dozen 
English cities from 6 to 10 August, the extraordinary turned ordinary for the courts. 
Whereas the rampant financial criminality at the top of the class structure leading to the 
near-collapse of the banking system in the autumn of 2008 saw no reactions from 
criminal justice even as it sent the UK economy into a tailspin, overturning millions of 
lives and causing hundreds of billions of pounds in damage
2
, street fracas at the bottom 
estimated to have cost under 150 million pounds triggered a lightning-fast and brutal 
response from the penal wing of the state. Those convicted of burglary during these 
nocturnal disturbances (that is, looting, however minor) have been sentenced with 
stunning celerity to an average of 14.1 months in prison, nearly double the usual rate of 
8.8 months; culprits of violent disorder reaped 10.4 months compared with the standard 
fare of 5.3 months while those nabbed for theft received sentences three times as long 
(7.1 months as against 2.4 months).
3
 After the riots stopped, the police deployed 
munificent resources and manifold schemes to track down and round up the looters, 
mining television footage and web postings, setting up phone lines for snitching, running 
“Shop A Looter” posters on buses, while politicians promised to cut welfare and housing 
benefits to the families of the culprits. 
 
Set against the political backdrop of steep state retrenchment and relentless invocation of 
personal responsibility, dramatic scenes of burning buildings, of bands of hooded and 
masked youths pillaging stores, and of thousands of police patrolling major streets in riot 
gear were bound to trigger rash statements and kneejerk government reaction. At the 
height of the riots as well as in their immediate aftermath, anyone attempting to formulate 
an explanation of the disorders other than a behavioural one was stridently denounced as 
effectively condoning or supporting rioting
4
.  Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London, 
embodied this posture when, upon being heckled by angry shopkeepers and frightened 
residents on the streets of Clapham, he responded: “It’s time we heard a little bit less 
about the sociological justifications for what is in my view nothing less than wanton 
criminality.”  As incidents spread to several London districts, and then to other cities of 
England, “criminality,” of either the “pure” or the “copycat” variety, quickly became the 
commonsense reason given for their occurrence, one that circulated freely amongst police 
chiefs, politicians across party divides, and the mainstream media. 
 
                                                 
2
 A damning account of the contribution of systematic illegal behavior to the financial bubble burst of 2008 
is Charles H. Ferguson’s award-winning documentary, The Inside Job (2010). The main reaction of the 
British government was to roll out a rescue package topping 500 billion pounds, lest the banking system 
disintegrate. 
3
 These figures come from court data painstakingly assembled by the reporters of The Guardian, available 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/sep/15/riot-defendants-court-sentencing  
4
 One illustration: the BBC was forced to issue an apology following its 9
th
 August interrogation of the 
veteran broadcaster Darcus Howe.  When Howe stated that he was not shocked by the riots, which in his 
view were an “insurrection” reflecting “the nature of the historical moment”, the interviewer accused him 
of being a rioter with a criminal past. 
This commentary starts from the opposite premise, that we need not less but more social 
science to shed light on the latest wave of urban rioting, and elucidate its political import.  
To do this we must trace a double nexus.  First, it is necessary to connect these eruptions 
to urban marginality in British society and pay attention not only to material deprivation 
but to the denial of dignity it implies.  Second, we must re-place the swift deployment of 
punitive action and discourses in response to the riots within the broader reengineering 
of the state according to a neoliberal blueprint that articulates (inter alia) social welfare 
reduction and penal expansion.   
 
 
Structural Violence 
 
 
Some facts on the riots are necessary before proceeding to the political response.  They 
began on 6
th
 August, following a peaceful evening protest outside a police station on 
Tottenham High Road at the 4
th
 August police killing of Mark Duggan, a father-of-four 
aged 29
5
.  Not long after the protest concluded, a 16 year-old girl approached police 
officers to voice her anger, and was allegedly beaten back with batons (Eddo-Lodge, 
2011).  Two police cars, a bus and several shops were then attacked, looted and set ablaze 
in Tottenham, and the anger soon spread to nearby Wood Green.  In the three nights that 
followed, rioting occurred across Greater London, in (inter alia) Enfield, Brixton, 
Hackney, Peckham, Clapham, Ealing and Croydon.  Outside the capital, rioting occurred 
first in Birmingham (8
th
 August), and later in Bristol, Manchester, Salford, Nottingham, 
Gloucester and Liverpool, with smaller disturbances in several other cities.  At the time 
of writing, well over 3000 people have been arrested, and 1715 people have been brought 
before the courts, of which 315 have been convicted and sentenced.
6
  The rather paltry 
court data available show that a majority of the 1715 are young (over half aged between 
18 and 24), male (90%), with a previous caution/conviction (73%). A majority live in 
areas classified in government databases as ‘multiply deprived’ (and 66% of those areas 
became even more deprived between 2007 and 2010).
7
 
 
It is beyond the scope of this commentary to offer an elaborate analysis of the motives of 
the rioters.  Nonetheless, a few initial observations are worth making.  In addition to the 
urgent need to dispel the shameful myth that BlackBerry Messenger was somehow 
responsible for what happened, the rioters’ focus on looting the stores rather than 
targeting any direct symbols of the state (with the exception of a few police cars) is 
helpfully interpreted by amplifying and extending Bauman’s (2011) characterization of 
                                                 
5
 The exact circumstances of his death remain unclear, but on 12
th
 August the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission (IPCC), with customary obliquity, announced that it ‘may’ have given misleading 
information to journalists that shots were fired between Duggan and the police.  Although a bullet was 
found lodged in a police radio, there is no evidence that it came from the gun in Duggan’s possession.  
Inquiries into Duggan’s death by the IPCC and the coroner continue, and a public hearing has been 
scheduled for 12
th
 December 2011. 
6
 That 1400 young people are still awaiting the outcome of criminal proceedings brought against them – 
and over half of those are remanded in custody – reveals the sheer scale of the criminal justice operation, 
and the agony their families continue to endure as they await verdicts. 
7
 Data from http://www.alex-singleton.com/  
“defective and disqualified consumers” seeking prized items (electrical goods, 
smartphones, trainers) to avoid “the wrath, humiliation, spite and grudge aroused by not 
having them”.8  As Bauman notes, social dignity is the most prized possession of all, and 
“non-shopping is the jarring and festering stigma of a life unfulfilled.”   But taking this 
issue of dignity further, it is prudent to look beyond ‘non-shopping’ to understand why 
indignity is visited upon the dispossessed youth of English cities. According to an 
interpretation of interview data gathered by sociologists embedded in communities 
affected by rioting, the looting was not ‘mindless violence’ but rather “a response to 
repeated stop-and-search, racist policing, deprivation, poverty, unemployment, cuts to the 
educational maintenance allowance (EMA), anger, and inequalities between the haves 
and the have-nots.” (James, 2011).  Furthermore, these interviews revealed that young 
people believe that “getting an education was the key to the golden gate, but a year after 
graduation they were still struggling to find work.” (ibid.)  Escalating youth 
unemployment (especially between ages 16-21, and particularly affecting males) has 
become a major issue over the last decade, and given the demographic involved it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that angry youths torching and looting their own 
communities is best understood as an oblique response to the compassion fatigue 
displayed by the state9.  Systemic failures of politics and a lack of civic regard amongst 
senior politicians of all stripes have created turbulence at the bottom of class structure. 
 
The institutional failures that have hammered youth in recent times have produced a 
response that should have been expected (given youths’ perceived lack of any 
alternative): direct confrontation with authorities and the disruption of civil life, a 
response to “massive structural violence unleashed upon them” (Wacquant, 2008, p.24). 
Recent European history from the banlieues of France (Dikec, 2007) to the sidewalks of 
Athens (Sotiris, 2010) shows that if young people are robbed of a sense that they have a 
dignified future awaiting them, they will take to the streets in collective rage. When 
considering the abysmal record of income inequality under the last Labour government 
(Dorling, 2010a), and now an economic crisis being addressed by a brutal series of 
budget cuts affecting public services (rather than the redistributive path: increasing 
taxation of corporations and the wealthy), one can begin to grasp the feelings of shared 
indignity and dishonour among a generation that feels abandoned and betrayed.  What is 
more, many youth involved reside in pockets of deep poverty surrounded by highly 
gentrified enclaves, particularly in London (Watt, 2006); their families have been 
relegated to stigmatised neighbourhoods10 “in which public and private resources 
                                                 
8
 http://beinghumanthesedays.com/zygmunt-bauman-on-the-london-riotszygmunt-bauman-on-the-london-
riots/  
9
 Prominent political figures were at pains to show their annoyance at having to cancel their foreign 
holidays and return to England to deal with the crisis.   
10
 The protest at the killing of Mark Duggan drew most of its participants from the intensely stigmatized 
housing estate of Broadwater Farm in north London.  It is not by happenstance that many of the ensuing 
riots occurred in city districts frequently labeled as ‘no-go areas’; the potency of the stigma attached to 
certain districts such as Handsworth (Birmingham), St. Paul’s (Bristol) and Toxteth (Liverpool) should not 
be underestimated in any analysis of these events.  As Wacquant (2007) has pointed out, the sense of 
personal indignity territorial stigmatization carries is a highly salient dimension of everyday life that 
negatively affects opportunities in social circles, education, and the labour market.  Furthermore, such 
stigmatization encourages amongst residents strategies of mutual avoidance and distancing which 
diminish just as the social fall of working-class households and the settlement of 
immigrant populations intensify competition for access to scarce public goods” 
(Wacquant, 2008, p.25). 
 
On 15th August, Paul Gilroy spoke with poignant eloquence about the riots at a 
community meeting in Tottenham.11  He reflected upon the 1981 riots in several British 
cities, and identified several parallels and contrasts in respect of the situation three 
decades later. Arguably his most useful analytical assertions were, first, that “the 
difference between 1981 and now is that the relationship between information and power 
has been changed, and our tactics for understanding our defence of our communities have 
to take those changes into account.”   Second, he stated that “one of the worst forms of 
poverty that’s shaped our situation is poverty of the imagination” in how social issues are 
addressed by politicians, particularly when considering the contexts to which they look 
for inspiration. These assertions provide a helpful framework to interpret the political 
import of the riots. 
 
 
On Information and Power: The Myth of the ‘Broken Society’ 
 
 
On the same day that Gilroy spoke in Tottenham, David Cameron visited a youth centre 
in his rural Witney constituency to deliver a speech outlining his Coalition government’s 
response to the riots
12
. He began by arguing that “these riots were not about poverty” but 
rather “about behaviour. People showing indifference to right and wrong. People with a 
twisted moral code. People with a complete absence of self-restraint.”  To confront what 
he sees as a “slow-motion moral collapse that has taken place in parts of our country 
these past few generations”, he outlined his “personal priority” in politics: “to mend our 
broken society”.  Particular emphasis was placed on “turning around the lives of the 
120,000
13
 most troubled families in the country”:  
 
“I don’t doubt that many of the rioters out last week have no father at home. Perhaps they come from one 
of the neighbourhoods where it’s standard for children to have a mum and not a dad, where it’s normal for 
young men to grow up without a male role model, looking to the streets for their father figures, filled up 
with rage and anger.” 
 
He went on to outline that a “social fightback” should be centered around fixing a welfare 
system that “encourages the worst in people”: 
 
“[There] is a moral hazard in our welfare system - people thinking they can be as irresponsible as they like 
because the state will always bail them out. … I want us to look at toughening up the conditions for those 
who are out of work and receiving benefits and speeding up our efforts to get all those who can work back 
to work.  Work is at the heart of a responsible society.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
exacerbate processes of social fission, feed interpersonal trust, and undermine the sense of collectivity 
necessary to engage in community-building and collective action.   
11
 http://dreamofsafety.blogspot.com/2011/08/paul-gilroy-speaks-on-riots-august-2011.html  
12
 http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-on-the-fightback-after-the-riots/  
13
 Quite where this figure came from is thus far a mystery.   
The story behind the rhetoric of a ‘broken society’ full of troubled families is a pure 
exemplar of the truncation and distortion of public understanding in respect of the 
ongoing articulation of poverty, social class and space in British society.  The rhetoric did 
not begin with Cameron, but rather with the publications of a right-wing think tank, the 
Centre for Social Justice (CSJ), the brainchild of his Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions: the self-proclaimed ‘quiet man’, Iain Duncan-Smith.    
 
During his tortured tenure (2001-2003) as Conservative Party leader, Duncan-Smith 
visited one of the poorest urban areas of the UK: Easterhouse in Glasgow, which he 
described as “a wrecked and dreadful set up…with families locked into generational 
breakdown” (quoted in Derbyshire, 2010)
14
.  In 2004, in an effort to get the 
‘modernising’ Conservatives to enter the electorally significant terra incognita of poverty 
and welfare, Duncan-Smith established the CSJ with this mission statement: 
 
“To put social justice at the heart of British politics and to build an alliance of poverty fighting 
organisations in order to see a reversal of social breakdown in the UK.”
15
 
 
Whilst a brief visit to its website leaves one bombarded by two words: “breakdown” and 
“broken”, nowhere on it or in any of its publications can a definition of ‘social justice’ be 
found.  Only in a 2010 interview in the New Statesman does Duncan-Smith attempt to 
define it: “I mean to improve the quality of people’s lives, which gives people the 
opportunity to improve their lives.  In other words, so people’s quality of life is 
improved.”  (quoted in Derbyshire, 2010). 
 
In 2006 the CSJ produced a voluminous document entitled Breakdown Britain
16
, the end-
product of Duncan-Smith being invited by Cameron “to consider how an incoming 
Conservative Government could tackle Britain’s most acute social problems.” (p.13)   
Duncan-Smith convened five working groups to conduct surveys and report back on five 
“pathways to poverty”: “family breakdown, educational failure, economic dependence, 
indebtedness and addiction,” for “if the drivers of poverty are not addressed an ever-
growing underclass will be created” (ibid.) Considerable attention was given to “family 
breakdown” in particular, and the central tenets of the infamous ‘underclass’ thesis lie in 
the CSJ’s definition of familial strife: 
 
“We have adopted an inclusive use of the term ‘family breakdown’ which can be summed up in three key 
words: dissolution, dysfunction, and ‘dad-lessness’.” (p.29) 
 
Peck (2006) notes how think tank conservatives “portray themselves as lonely voices of 
reason, as principled outsiders in a corrupt, distracted, and wrongheaded world” (p.682).  
This captures precisely the tenor of the Breakdown Britain report, especially on “family 
breakdown”: 
                                                 
14
 He has on many occasions spoken of this visit a life-changing experience, “a sort of Damascene point” 
(ibid.).   
15
 http://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/default.asp?pageRef=44  
16
 It was later followed by a package of ‘policy recommendations’ entitled “Breakthrough Britain”, with 
numerous sub-reports focusing on particular cities: Breakthrough Manchester, Breakthrough Glasgow, 
Breakthrough Birmingham, etc. 
 
“The policy-making community (which includes politicians, policy-makers and academics) has been 
markedly reluctant to grasp the nettle of family breakdown by being clear about the benefits of marriage 
and committed relationships, and the merits of supporting and encouraging them. (p.29) 
 
In a series of papers, Gerry Mooney and colleagues (Mooney, 2009; Mooney and 
Neal, 2010; Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Gray and Mooney, 2011) have provided an 
insightful interrogation of ‘Broken Britain’ rhetoric, from its roots in stigmatised eastern 
Glasgow, to its electoral significance (‘Broken Britain’ was pivotal to the Conservatives’ 
2010 General Election campaign, propped up by the Rupert Murdoch tabloids), and now 
to its contemporary public policy undercurrent where “marriage and a stable two-parent 
family life are key to mending Broken Britain and thereby reducing levels of poverty.” 
(Mooney and Neal, 2010: 145)  For the CSJ, there is no social problem for which 
promoting marriage is not the solution.  It is desperate to guard against any views to the 
contrary; for example, when a distinguished welfare historian argued that the CSJ present 
a misleading and empirically inaccurate portrait of a British past filled with “happy 
families” (Thane, 2010), the CSJ responded quickly with an aggrieved 24-page rebuttal 
written by two legal scholars (Probert and Callan, 2010).  Over two decades ago, Charles 
Murray (1990, p.41) visited London and recommended to policy elites, journalists and 
think tank officials that the “civilising force of marriage” be the treatment for the 
“spreading disease” of an “underclass” of single mothers (for whom “sex is fun and 
[having] babies is endearing”) and absent fathers (“essentially barbarians”) (see 
Wacquant, 2009a, p.7-54). The CSJ has revived this much-derided perspective, which 
influenced David Cameron’s choice of Father’s Day to write a column in The Sunday 
Telegraph that made the following argument: 
 
“I also think we need to make Britain a genuinely hostile place for fathers who go AWOL. It’s high time 
runaway dads were stigmatised, and the full force of shame was heaped upon them. They should be looked 
at like drink drivers, people who are beyond the pale.” (Cameron, 2011). 
 
 
The notions of a broken society full of dysfunctional families heavily influenced 
Duncan-Smith’s Welfare Reform Bill currently working its way through Parliament, the 
hallmark of which is conditionality: punitive sanctions applied to claimants17.  If the Bill 
is passed, from 2013 unemployed people will lose benefits for three months if they refuse 
the offer of a job for the first time, six months if they refuse an offer twice, and three 
years if they refuse an offer three times. Given that the CSJ “Economic Dependency” 
working group “went to the United States to talk to the architects of American welfare 
reform”, and that Lawrence Mead
18
 was invited to Downing Street to advise the Coalition 
government on work policies immediately after it was formed in May 2010, it is 
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 In one of the more depressing outcomes of the riots, an e-petition calling for convicted rioters to have 
their benefits permanently removed attracted well over 100,000 signatures, meaning that the topic will now 
be subject to a Parliamentary debate.   Nobody seems to have made the point that plans to remove benefits 
are already underway for those living at the bottom of the class structure. 
18
 Mead was arguably the most influential scholarly voice behind 1990s welfare-to-work legislation in the 
United States, consistently arguing that paid employment is an obligation of citizenship. 
unsurprising that Duncan-Smith commented thus on the launch of the Bill: “play ball or 
it’s going to be difficult.” (quoted in Porter and Riddell, 2010). 
 
Think tanks have mastered the craft of decision-based evidence making, tailored to the 
needs of policy elites and politicians on the lookout for accessible catchphrases to woo a 
jaded electorate.  Politicians rarely consult published social science research unless it 
supports the policies they want to pursue (not a single social scientist was a member of 
any of the CSJ working groups studying the five “pathways to poverty”).  Instead, they 
depend on neat sound bites from surveys that measure little more than the worldview of 
the institute that commissions them, where policy ‘researchers’ set out to resolve false 
problems (even though they have been settled in the way survey questions were 
formulated).  Paul Gilroy is correct that the relationship between information and power 
has changed since the 1980s: think tanks are now critically important in how state power 
is mobilized in the extension of conservative, market-rule dogma (Peck and Tickell, 
2007); they have “irrevocably altered the institutional matrix through which policy 
knowledge percolates” (Wacquant, 2010, p.442). Think tanks actively manufacture 
ignorance to appease their funders (Monbiot, 2011), buffering politicians and their 
audiences from viable alternatives and inoculating them against the critique of 
autonomous scholarship.  
 
 
Super-Cop: the ‘Poverty of the Imagination’ 
 
 
Gilroy’s observation that there is a “poverty of the imagination” in dealing with social 
issues derives from his critique of politicians reaching for what they think is the future: 
the supposed lessons to be learned from the US.  Gilroy was particularly troubled by 
something in Cameron’s 11
th
 August emergency statement to Parliament: 
 
“I also believe we should be looking beyond our shores to learn the lessons from others who have faced 
similar problems. That is why I will be discussing how we can go further in getting to grips with gangs with 
people like Bill Bratton, former Commissioner of Police in New York and Los Angeles.” 
 
That organized street gangs were not a major factor in the riots did not seem to matter: 
Bill Bratton immediately found himself being touted by journalists as a Dick Tracy 
figure, a ‘super-cop’ who could come and sort out the problem of English street crime 
once and for all
19
 because of his apparent successes in New York and Los Angeles.   
 
Although Bratton arguably helped rebuild police morale in both New York and Los 
Angeles, the drop in crime in both those cities had nothing to do with his stewardship.  In 
New York, where he was in charge for only two years, he applied ‘zero tolerance’ in a 
city where crime was already dropping for several other reasons (Bowling, 1999; 
Harcourt, 2001); in Los Angeles he applied ‘community policing’ (the exact opposite 
                                                 
19
 Bratton was attracted to the vacant post of Chief Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police until 
it was realized that, as a non-UK citizen, he could not apply. 
 
tactic) and crime dipped for other reasons (Goldberger and Rosenfeld, 2009). Proof of 
Bratton’s ineffectiveness is that he failed miserably in impacting crime in Latin America, 
where he sold his ‘expertise’ through his private security firm (Swanson, 2007; Mountz 
and Curran, 2009). The irony is that UK policy elites want Bratton to come to England 
and deliver ‘zero tolerance’ when Bratton saw the failure of that model and switched to 
‘community policing’ - which is patterned after UK policing.  In the US, Bratton’s 
expertise is with cleaning up police department corruption at the bottom and facing lethal 
street violence. In urban England, the problem is police corruption at the top (as 
evidenced by the phone-hacking scandal) and low-level predominantly non-lethal street 
disorders. These are very different issues, and Bratton as consultant will add nothing 
progressive to the debate about how to address the issue of street crime sensitively and 
humanely.   
 
The structural reasons for the English riots are not issues that a US police chief can 
resolve, yet the climate of ‘fast’ international policy transfer that has become so 
embedded in the institutional apparatus of neoliberal statecraft (Ward and McCann, 2011) 
ensures that the causes of advanced urban marginality (state retrenchment, economic 
deregulation, wage labour fragmentation) are ignored in favour of expanding the penal 
wing of the state (Wacquant, 2009b).  Again the role of think tanks is critically important: 
Bratton’s status as a ‘super-cop’ is less a media construct and more a think-tank 
fabrication: the Manhattan Institute in New York City played a pivotal role in 
(re)packaging and validating the ‘broken windows theory’ in the US (even as it was 
repeatedly refuted by that country’s respected criminologists) and in the international 
dissemination (via like-minded think tanks in London) of the strategy of ‘zero tolerance’ 
policing which was allegedly derived from it (Mitchell, 2010).  If we are to challenge the 
poverty of the imagination that shields the public from examples of progressive policies 
in countries other than the US, it is essential to expose the practices and funding of think 
tanks, to scrutinize their glossy and authoritative pseudo-scientific publications, and 
dispel the myths propagated by their speechwriters and backroom ‘researchers’. 
 
 
A Class Primer? 
 
 
“What I think we shouldn’t do is say, as some seem to on the left: ‘Well, we can’t really do anything about 
the problem of the riots and criminality that we saw until we have dealt with selfishness and greed 
elsewhere.’ Some people almost say that until we deal with the problem of inequality in our society, there 
is nothing you can do to deal with rioting.” 
       David Cameron, 2
nd
 September 2011 
 
 
‘Inequality’ is always a word that makes conservative politicians feel uncomfortable.  
This is partly because addressing and arresting inequality invokes what they see as the 
fearsome spectre of ‘equality’, which has redistributive and socialist connotations 
offensive to free market ideology.  Although the Centre for Social Justice has tried to 
change the very meaning of social justice, conservatives in the UK are most concerned 
with avoiding social (family) breakdown, not achieving an abstraction like “justice”, and 
this has always underpinned their view of the welfare state. Conservative politicians, 
historically, only take an interest in such matters only in so far as it assists social 
cohesion to do so, and doesn’t ferment revolt where the wealthy might be required to 
relinquish their private property rights. One of the more fascinating debates to have 
emerged in the UK over the past two years has been around Wilkinson and Pickett’s 
(2010) best-selling The Spirit Level, which presents remarkably wide-ranging evidence to 
demonstrate that more equal societies are better for everyone, including the wealthy
20
.  
However, though this work is foundational, and important for policy remediation vis-à-
vis inequality, not to mention when combined with similar contributions that demonstrate 
the extent and damaging implications of inequality in the UK (Dorling, 2010b), such 
volumes require the support of analyses that focus on the role of the broken state as the 
major determinant of the intensity and forms assumed by advanced marginality.   
 
Cabinet ministers and leading police officers are highly authoritarian and punitive when it 
comes to dealing with the destructive consequences of economic deregulation for those at 
the lower end of the class and status spectrum.  The state is responding to the marginality 
it has created (manifested in the existence of unemployment, homelessness, ‘criminality’, 
drugs, idle and apoplectic “feral underclass”21 youths, school exclusion, ‘family 
breakdown’) by containing it and inducing the expanding precariat (Standing, 2011) to 
accept the unstable and underpaid jobs of the deregulated service economy via workfarist 
reforms. But at the same time, those ministers and police officers exhibit a strikingly 
laissez-faire ethos toward the causal agents of inequality at the top end: powerful 
corporations and the ‘overclass’ (for example, media tycoons and heads of financial and 
banking corporations, but also at parliamentarians who stole from the public coffers with 
illegal reimbursements).  It speaks volumes of the civic unaccountability and personal 
immorality of ruling elites over the past decade that the phrase “copycat criminality” has 
not been applied to the financial institutions of the London square mile (and the 
politicians that count on donations from those institutions), and that the massive crime 
and commotion that triggered the 2007-8 financial collapse has still gone unpunished 
whilst the state reacts with diligence and virulence against street crime.  The fact that all 
political parties appear to dance to the same (neo)liberal-paternalist anthem not only 
reveals the evaporation of legitimacy they have inflicted upon themselves; it reveals the 
prescience of Colin Leys’ (1990) warning that “for an ideology to be hegemonic, it is not 
necessary that it be loved.  It is merely necessary that it have no serious rival.” (p.127)  
The rival ideology, however, will not be found in Westminster.  Paul Gilroy concluded 
his contribution to the Tottenham community meeting by pointing out that the reaction to 
the riots is a valuable “primer” in class solidarity, where ruling elites are “telling us 
something”: 
 
“[T]hey think and act and conduct themselves like a class. They chat to each other, they marry each other, 
they go to the same places... And if we want to act as a body, if we want to act in concert, we have to learn 
something from the way they conduct themselves, even as we challenge what they do.” 
 
                                                 
20
 Their conclusions scared the right so deeply that Policy Exchange, another think tank described as David 
Cameron’s “favourite”, commissioned a formerly leftist urban scholar, Peter Saunders (2010), to 
interrogate their data and the methodology under a declamatory response entitled “Beware False Prophets”.   
21
 This was the description of the rioters made by Kenneth Clarke, the Justice Secretary. 
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